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1Hence without loss of generality, I can assume this ﬁnance is supplied by the receiver. Thus
the problem which deﬁnes ex-ante welfare is identical in the UK system to the US system with
one creditor. Thus ﬁx n as either 1 or N > 1. Consider the following problem with the US
law.
θh,n ∈ {1,N} = argminSL(θh,n,δ) (44)
such that R(θh,n,δ) = I (45)
If N solves the above problem, the US system maximizes welfare. If not welfare is equiv-
alent in the two systems.
Now given this alternative form of the problem, I show that any N > 1 such that the above
problem is well deﬁned solves the problem for δ sufﬁciently high.
To prove the proposition, ﬁx N > 1 and I and pick  arbitrarily small.
Let θh(N,δ) and θh(1,δ) be the values of θh associated with the N and one creditor systems
at I. Note both terms increase in δ. Also choose δ such
θh(N,δ) − θh(1,δ) < 
Such a choice is possible since for high discount factors, the one creditor system produces
arbitrarily small revenues in bankruptcy. Also note that for δ sufﬁciently high, θh(1,δ) is
bounded away from zero. Next I transform the SL function so that it does not converge to zero
as δ converges to one. Let SLB(θh,n,δ) =
q
SL(θh,n,δ)
1−δ
Note immediately that SLB is continuous over the relevant range of every variable.
Next I use identity (21) to bound SLB(θh,1,δ) − SLB(θh,N,δ) from below by using the
implied differences in the belief updating function. Note the β which solves equation (21) is
continuous in δ. Let θa = β and write it as a function of N and δ. Take the limit of θa(n,δ) as
δ goes to one. For n = 1 this limit is one. For n = N, this limit is strictly bounded away from
1. Consider:
M(δ
∗) = inf
δ≥δ∗
θa(1,δ)
p
1 − δθa(1,δ)2 −
θa(N,δ)
p
1 − δθa(N,δ)2.
M is continuous and converges to ∞. For δ∗ sufﬁciently high this number must be bounded
away from zero.
Also let c ≥ sup
θa(N,δ) √
1−δθa(N,δ)2 which is bounded from above. Also choose c to be ﬁnite.
Consider
SLB (θh(1,δ),1,δ) − SLB (θh(1,δ),N,δ)
which is
≥ M(δ)(θh(1,δ)) − c ∗ (θh(N,δ) − θh(1,δ))
For  sufﬁciently small (δ sufﬁciently close to one), the ﬁrst term is bounded away from
zero, whereas the second term converges to zero. Hence,
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